

TriviA: A Fast and Secure Authenticated Encryption Scheme

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Outline of the talk

- 1 Introduction.
- 2 Underlying Mathematical Components.
- 3 Specification of TriviA
- 4 Security Theorems and Security Bounds
- 5 Properties of TriviA
- 6 Hardware Results for TriviA

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Authenticated Encryption (AE)

Why AE?

- **Privacy** of **Plaintext**.
- **Authenticity** of the **plaintext/ ciphertext** and **associated data**.

More Formally....

- **Tagged**-encryption : $\text{AE.enc} : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$
- **Verified**-decryption : $\text{AE.dec} : \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \cup \perp$

Stream Cipher

Formally

- Encrypts in *bit level*.
- Key stream $K = \text{KeyGen}(MK, N, |M|)$
- M , C and K are *bitstreams*.
- $C_i = \text{Enc}_{K_i}(M_i) = (K_i + M_i) \bmod 2$
- $M_i = \text{Dec}_{K_i}(C_i) = (K_i + C_i) \bmod 2$

Popular Ciphers : **Trivium**, Grain, Salsa etc.

ϵ - Δ U-(Universal) Hash

Formally

- $h : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$
- $\forall \delta \in \mathcal{R}, \forall x \neq x' \in \mathcal{D}, \Pr_{K \in \mathcal{K}}[h(K; x) - h(K; x') = \delta] \leq \epsilon$

Examples


- Multilinear Hash (**ML**), Pseudo Dot Product Hash (**PDP**), **Toeplitz** Hash.

Universal Hash with Minimum Multiplications

- Encode-Hash-Combine (**EHC**).

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
TriviA Encryption Mode



- **TriviA-SC** - Updated version of **Trivium**.
- **EHC-Hash** - Universal Hash follows **EHC** technique.
- **TriviA-SC** generates
 - *Encryption* key stream
 - *Authentication* key stream*parallelly*

A Trivium Based Stream Cipher : TriviA-SC

TriviA-SC Circuit




TriviA-SC Informations

- 384-bit state - A (132-bit), B (105-bit) and C (147-bit)
- Load 128-bit key and 128-bit nonce, 1152-round init
- 64-bit parallelism (KeyExt64 and Update64)
- *Nonlinearity* in the output
- KeyExt64 - From output, StExt64 - From state

Circuit of EHC Hash

EHC Circuit




EHC-Hash Informations

- Underlying Fields - $\mathbb{F}_{2^{32}}$ (α) and $\mathbb{F}_{2^{64}}$ (β)
- *Expand/Encode-Hash-Combine*
 - *Encode(Expand)* by ECCode_d ($\text{VHorner}_{64/d}$)
 - *Blockwise Hash* by PDP-Hash (32-bit Multiplier)
 - *Combine* by $\text{VMult}_{\alpha,d}$ ($\text{VHorner}_{32/d+1}$)
- One 32-bit Multiplication for 64-bit block.
- EHC is 2^{-128} - Δ - U hash

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Lower Level Structure of TriviA



Informations on TriviA

- Updated to the *CAESAR* second round
- *Arbitrary* length M (padded with 10^*) divided into **64-bit Blocks**
- **Intermediate tag (if any)** - Computed after each ck blocks.
 - $ck = 0$ for this Paper (no intermediate tag).
 - $ck \in \{0, 128\}$ for CAESAR submission.
- $|C| = |M|, |T| = 128$

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Privacy Bound for TriviA

Theorem

Let A be a relaxed nonce-respecting adversary which makes at most q encryption queries. Moreover we assume that A can make at most 2^{32} queries with a same nonce. Then, $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{TriviA}}^{\text{priv}}(A) \leq \frac{q}{2^{128}}$.

Authenticity Bound for TriviA

Theorem

Let A be a relaxed nonce-respecting adversary which makes at most q queries such that nonce can repeat up to 2^{32} times. In addition, A is making at most q_f forging attempt. If the stream cipher Trivia-SC is perfectly secure then

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{TriviA}}^{\text{auth}}(A) \leq \frac{q}{2^{128}} + \frac{q_f}{2^{124}} .$$

Security Level for TriviA

Security Bounds

Version	Confidentiality	Authenticity
TriviA-0	128	124
TriviA-128	128	124

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
Important Properties of TriviA

- Options for **Intermediate Tag**.
- **TriviA-SC** - Updated design of a well studied and efficient (both in hardware and software) stream cipher **Trivium**.
- **High** security level- **128**-bits for **confidentiality** and **124**-bits for **Authenticity** of plaintext.
- **High speed** hardware.

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TriviA-Base Architecture

TriviA-Base




TriviA-Base Architecture Properties

- No *pipelined* register
- *Parallel* processing of data
- Processes **64**-bits/ cycle
- *Long Critical path* : (2×1) **64**-bit *MUX* \rightarrow **64**-bit *XOR* \rightarrow **32**-bit *Mult* \rightarrow *Tag* Updation \rightarrow (3×1) **160**-bit *MUX*
- Reduced Speed, Throughput

TriviA-Pipelined Architecture

TriviA-Pipelined



TriviA-Pipelined Architecture Properties

- 2 operations in series
 - 32-bit multiplication
 - *Tag* updation
- *Shorter Critical path* : (2×1) 64-bit MUX \rightarrow 64-bit XOR \rightarrow 32-bit Mult
- 3 stage pipeline : Increased *throughput, frequency*
- 3 extra clock cycles (*Blue, Orange* and *Green* blocks)

TriviA ASIC Implementation

- Verilog HDL, Synopsys Design Compiler J-2014.09
 - Technology node: UMC 65nm logic SP/RVT Low-K process
-
- Base Implementation
 - Area : 23.6 KGE
 - Frequency : 1150 MHZ, Throughput : 73.9 Gbps
-
- Pipelined Implementation
 - Area : 24.4 KGE
 - Frequency : 1425 MHZ, Throughput : 91.2 Gbps

Comparison with Other Results

AE Schemes	ASIC Implementation			Cycles/ Byte (cpb)	
	Area (KGE)	Throughput (Gbps)	Efficiency (Mbps/ GE)		
TriviA Base	23.6	73.9	3.13	0.12	
TriviA Pipelined	24.4	91.2	3.73	0.12	
Scream, iScream	17.29	5.19	0.30	-	
NORX	62	28.2	0.45	-	
Ascon	7.95	7.77	0.98	0.75	
AEGIS	AO1	20.55	1.35	0.07	6.67
	AO2	60.88	37.44	0.61	0.33
	TO1	88.91	53.55	0.60	0.20
	TO2	172.72	121.07	0.70	0.07

TriviA FPGA Results

- Xilinx ISE 14.7
- Default settings, no optimizations
- Pre-layout synthesis
- 5.4x better (in terms of area efficiency) of than *AES-CCM*

TriviA FPGA Results Comparison

<i>Xilinx FPGA Platform</i>	AES-CCM			TriviA-Base			TriviA- Pipelined
	<i># Slices</i>	<i>Gbps</i>	<i>Area— Efficiency (Mbps/Slice)</i>	<i># Slices</i>	<i>Gbps</i>	<i>Area— Efficiency (Mbps/Slice)</i>	<i>Area— Efficiency (Mbps/Slice)</i>
Spartan-6 -3	272	>0.57	2.09	815	7.6	9.3	11.29
Virtex-5 -3	343	>0.78	2.27	637	11.7	18.3	20.3
Virtex-6 -3	295	>0.87	2.95	725	16	22	25
Kintex-7 -3	296	>1	3.38	714	16.89	23.65	24.31
Virtex-7 -3	296	>1	3.38	714	16.89	23.65	24.31

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Conclusion

- *SC* and *PI* hash based *AE*
- Achieves *high* provable security bound
- Well Studied *SC* and *PI* hash needs *minimum* multiplication
- *High speed* AE and *high area-efficiency*

Thank you